Peranan pengawasan pelabur institusi dan kekaburan perolehan

Translated title of the contribution: The monitoring role of institutional investors and earning opacity

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Institutional investors are regarded as sophisticated investors who have the potential to monitor managers and help reduce firm's agency cost. This study examines the monitoring role of institutional investors in an environment of high public funds presence and high government intervention. It focuses on the effects of institutional ownership on portfolio firms ' earnings management by examining the association between institutional ownership and earnings opacity. This study also provides evidence on the effect of public/non-public status of institutional investors on their monitoring effectiveness. Institutional presence isproxied by three measures: (1) percentage of institutional equity shareholdings; (2) concentration of institutional shareholdings; and (3) number of institutional investors. Propensity to manage earnings is measured by four attributes of earnings numbers that could lead to earnings opacity: (1) earnings aggressiveness; (2) earnings smoothness; (3) loss avoidance; and (4) earnings decreases avoidance, aggregated into firm level scores of earnings opacity. Data were obtained from Datastream and annual reports of samples firms listed on the Main Board and Second Board of Bursa Malaysia from 1996 to 2005. Association between institutional ownership and earnings opacity is tested via multiple regression analysis controlling for management shareholdings, firm size, firm's leverage level and audit quality. Results show that non-public institutional investors with concentrated shareholdings provide more effective monitoring in comparison to public institutional investors.

Original languageUndefined/Unknown
Pages (from-to)83-101
Number of pages19
JournalJurnal Pengurusan
Volume32
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2011

Fingerprint

Institutional investors
Monitoring
Opacity
Shareholding
Institutional ownership
Avoidance
Agency costs
Multiple regression analysis
Earnings management
Annual reports
Managers
Leverage
Equity
Government intervention
Propensity
Investors
Malaysia
Audit quality
Data streams
Firm size

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
  • Accounting
  • Business and International Management

Cite this

Peranan pengawasan pelabur institusi dan kekaburan perolehan. / Ahmad, Azlina; Mohd Saleh, Norman; Iskandar, Takiah Mohd; Alias, Mohmad Adnan.

In: Jurnal Pengurusan, Vol. 32, 07.2011, p. 83-101.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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