Empowering small fishermen through simultaneous and sequential marketing strategies

Nik Hashim Nik Mustapha, Nik Mohd Hazrul Nik Hashim, Ridzuan Yacob

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

One of the socio-economic issues often discussed in marketing of marine catch of small-scale fishermen is the agent-principal relationship. They become socially obliged to the benefits and assistance provided by credit agents specifically when their credits accumulated. This asymmetric circumstance has empowered the credit agent to gain control over the marketing of fishermen daily catches. Another form of marketing strategy that has never been investigated before, at least in the fishing industry, is the way by which fishermen catches are brought to the market place. Specifically, we posit those who are dominant in the market will be affected by either simultaneous (collusive and non-collusive) or sequential marketing strategies. Drawing on strategic game theory using data from fisheries statistics, this study is aimed at identifying policies for the least advantaged small fishermen to improve their income and thus their livelihood. Efficient outcomes which are the net incomes derived from fishing activities of small versus medium, medium versus large and small versus large vessel fishermen were used in the analysis of marketing strategies. Evidently, whilst merging is profitable to the small fishermen, sequential with small fishermen as the first mover is also profitable but has more profound impact on the society's welfare.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)18-31
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Sustainability Science and Management
Volume9
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Fingerprint

marketing
Marketing
credit
fishery statistics
income
fishing industry
game theory
market
Fisheries
Gain control
Game theory
Merging
fishery
livelihood
fishing
vessel
assistance
welfare
statistics
Statistics

Keywords

  • Collusive simultaneous strategy
  • First mover
  • Followers
  • Non-collusive
  • Sequential marketing strategy
  • Strategic games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
  • Pollution
  • Geography, Planning and Development

Cite this

Empowering small fishermen through simultaneous and sequential marketing strategies. / Mustapha, Nik Hashim Nik; Nik Hashim, Nik Mohd Hazrul; Yacob, Ridzuan.

In: Journal of Sustainability Science and Management, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2014, p. 18-31.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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